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INTRODUCTION 
By mid-March 2011, the worsening crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic (“Syria”) had 
rapidly become the center of regional and international attention.1 Since that time, Syria 
has experienced a major humanitarian crisis, which still continues. As of this writing, there 
is no indication that the fighting will end any time soon. The international community has 
not only failed to prevent mass atrocities in Syria, but has also failed to take timely action 
to react effectively. Given the politics that has characterized the Syrian crisis to date, the 
likelihood of effective international cooperation on rebuilding Syria is also bleak.  
 The Syrian crisis involves multiple, serious problems that undermine the 
importance of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle in international relations and 
international law. This crisis highlighted the controversy on whether a state can use force 
for humanitarian purposes without Security Council authorization, a long-standing 
international legal question that did not arise in the Darfur, Libya, or Côte d’Ivoire crises. 
The use of force to effect regime change in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire also undermined the 
United Nations (UN) taking effective action in Syria. In fact, China and Russia refused to 
authorize the use of force for, amongst other rationales, reasons related to their positions 
on the abuse of Security Council authorization in the previous R2P crises of Libya and Côte 
d’Ivoire. Security Council members, at least, could not agree on humanitarian relief issues 
in the Syrian crisis. These disagreements illustrate many of the serious problems that have 
been encountered under the R2P principle during the Syrian crisis. 
This Article seeks to give a bird’s eye view on the positions taken by some of the UN 
Member States on the Syrian issue, their role in shaping R2P, and, as a follow up, whether 
                                                          
1  E.g., Peter Wilkinson, Syria: How Will Year-Old Conflict Play Out?, CNN (Mar. 15, 2012, 9:12 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/15/world/meast/syria-what-next. 
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R2P was successful in changing international law on humanitarian intervention. The 
Article proceeds first to understand some efforts taken by key international actors to 
prevent the Syrian crisis. It then proceeds to briefly analyze efforts by key international 
actors in implementing their responsibility to react to the Syrian crisis. Finally, it evaluates 
how this blend of reactions by the international community to the Syrian crisis failed to 
make a solid grounding for R2P to change international law on humanitarian intervention. 
  
I. APPLICATION OF THE R2P PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE SYRIAN 
 CRISIS 
The Syrian conflict has been widely discussed as another test case for the R2P 
principle in international law. From the initial stages of the crisis, there were serious claims 
that mass atrocities were carried out in Syria.2 Still, we witness mass-exodus of civilians 
from Syria on a daily basis. Growing concerns about the deteriorating security situation in 
Syria brought R2P into the debates within the international community. The Independent 
International Commission of Inquiry on Syria, established by the UN Secretary-General on 
August 22, 2011, concluded that the government of Syria had manifestly failed in its 
responsibility to protect the population. The inquiry further found that gross violations of 
human rights had been committed in Syria by both the government as well as the armed 
anti-government groups.3 These atrocities triggered controversies largely centered on the 
R2P responsibilities to prevent and react. With the Assad regime manifestly failing to 
protect the Syrian population, the international community, regional organizations, and 
the UN took a number of diplomatic measures to help prevent further atrocities in Syria.  
 
A. Responsibility to Prevent  
As the crisis in Syria was unfolding, the Security Council first discussed the situation 
during a meeting on Israel-Palestine negotiations on April 21, 2011—soon after the Security 
Council’s actions on R2P in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire in March 2011.4 By the end of March 
2011, Syrian government forces shot protesters in Damascus and the southern city of Deraa 
who had demanded release of political prisoners. These actions triggered days of violent 
unrest that steadily spread nationwide over the following months. The United States, 
United Kingdom, and France expressed their concern about the dire human rights situation 
                                                          
2  See The Crisis in Syria, INT’L COALITION FOR RESP. TO PROTECT,  
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-syria (last visited Mar. 27, 2016). 
3  Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 
Seventeenth Special Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, at 1, 8 (Nov. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Rep. of the 
Independent International Commission of Inquiry]. 
4  U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6520th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.6520 (Apr. 21, 2011). 
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in Syria.5 However, the Russian delegation stated that it did not wish to interfere in the 
internal affairs of any sovereign state.6  
In the face of the Syrian government’s harsh retaliation against the protests that 
escalated throughout the country, the Security Council held its first session on Syria on 
April 27, 2011, in which most delegates strongly condemned gross human rights violations 
in Syria.7 The delegations stressed the need to help Syria in order to prevent further 
violence and civilian suffering.8 The United States Ambassador, Susan Rice, stated that the 
United States condemned, in the strongest possible terms, the abhorrent violence used by 
the government of Syria.9 The United Kingdom stressed the Syrian government’s 
responsibility to protect peaceful protesters and the need to stop violent repression of such 
protesters. The UK further highlighted that the protestors themselves must ensure that 
their actions were peaceful. While China and India expressed their concern about the 
incidents taking place in Syria, Russia stated that the current situation in Syria did not 
present a threat to international peace and security.10 The Member States of the Security 
Council (“Member States”) considered issuing a press statement as proposed by the 
European Union (EU).11 However, the statement, which stressed the Syrian government’s 
responsibility to prevent violence against their own people could not be issued because 
there was no agreement among the Member States. In particular, Russia and Lebanon 
objected, stating that such a press statement would be undue interference into the internal 
affairs of Syria.12 
In response to mounting international unease about the deteriorating human rights 
situation in Syria, the Human Rights Council held a special session on April 29, 2011, and 
adopted Resolution 16/1.13 The resolution condemned the Syrian government’s attacks 
against the civilian population and expressed grave concerns about alleged deliberate 
killings, arrests, and instances of torture of peaceful protesters by Syrian authorities. The 
resolution called for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to urgently dispatch a 
fact-finding mission to investigate alleged human rights violations in Syria. Although 
Resolution 16/1 was adopted by a majority of votes of the Human Rights Council, notable 
                                                          
5  Id. at 8, 15, 21. 
6  Id. at 26. 
7  U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6524th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.6524 (Apr. 27, 2011). 
8  E.g., id. at 8. 
9  Id. at 4. 
10  Id. at 7–8. 
11  Neil MacFarquhar, Push in U.N. for Criticism of Syria is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/world/middleeast/28nations.html?_r=0. 
12  Id. 
13  Human Rights Council Res. S-16/1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-16/1 (Apr. 29, 2011). 
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opposition was raised by some Member States. China, Russia, Pakistan, and Malaysia voted 
against the resolution, while the delegations of Nigeria and Saudi Arabia abstained.14 
Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution 16/1, “the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights established a [fact-finding mission] to investigate all alleged violations of 
international human rights law in Syria [. . .] to establish the facts and circumstances of 
such violations and of the crimes perpetrated, with a view to avoiding impunity and 
ensuring full accountability.”15 Although no explicit reference was made to R2P, the fact-
finding mission itself was to complement the responsibility of the international community 
to prevent further atrocities in Syria. In May 2011, the fact-finding mission began and the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights made a formal request to the government of Syria 
to cooperate.16 Despite repeated requests by the Human Rights Council, the Syrian 
government did not cooperate with the fact-finding mission. Nonetheless, the mission 
gathered credible, corroborated, and consistent accounts of violations from victims and 
witnesses.17  
As the Syrian government increased its suppression of the opposition, the Human 
Rights Council and some UN Member States put more pressure on the Syrian regime. In 
succeeding months, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Germany, and 
Portugal made efforts to pass a resolution of the Security Council condemning the Syrian 
government’s atrocities, efforts that failed in the face of resistance from Russia, China, 
Brazil, South Africa, and India.18 Although the resolution noted that the widespread and 
systematic attacks by the Syrian authorities against its people may amount to crimes 
against humanity under international law, it did not refer to R2P or the responsibility to 
prevent such atrocities. The Member States that resisted the resolution argued that the 
Syrian crisis was an internal matter and the Security Council should not dictate the nature 
of any reform program that the Syrian government should undertake.19 These Member 
States absolutely refused any external military intervention in Syria.20  
                                                          
14  Id. at 3. 
15  Fact Finding Mission on Syria: Call for Submissions (A/HRC/RES/S-16/1), OFF. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER 
FOR HUM. RTS. (May 24, 2011), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/MENARegion/Pages/SyriaFactFindingMission.aspx. 
16  OHCHR Fact-Finding Mission to Syria Terms of Reference, OFF. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS. 1–
2 (May 24, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/SY/TORs_FFM_Syria.pdf. 
17  See Human Rights Council Debates Situation of Human Rights in Syrian Arab Republic in Special Session, OFF. UNITED 
NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS. (Aug. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Human Rights Council], 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11324&LangID=E. 
18 Dan Bilefsky, New Move to Condemn Syria in U.N., N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/world/middleeast/09nations.html?_r=0; UN Deadlocked Over Draft Syria 
Resolution, as Crackdown Continues, Radio Free Eur. Radio Liberty (June 14, 2011 11:13 AM GMT). 
19  Id. 
20 Id. 
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Although the Syrian crisis was considered an internal matter by some Member 
States, violence in Syria began to creep across the borders into Turkey. In addition, Syrian 
refugees had become an international concern by the end of 2011.21 More than 2.5 million 
Syrians had fled their homes by the end of 2011, taking refuge in neighboring countries or 
within Syria itself.22 Absorbing the massive influx of refugees has been a huge challenge for 
Syria’s neighbors, with serious consequences for the stability of the entire region.  
Given the escalation of violence and other humanitarian problems in Syria, Francis 
Deng, the Secretary General’s Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, and Edward 
Luck, the Secretary General’s Special Advisor on R2P, issued a statement on Syria on July 
21, 2011.23 Emphasizing that the atrocities in Syria amounted to the crimes against 
humanity, the Special Advisors urged the Syrian government to fulfill its responsibility to 
protect its civilian populations.24 
In August 2011, after much discussion, the Security Council adopted a presidential 
statement expressing grave concern about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Syria 
and calling for unimpeded access for humanitarian workers.25 While reaffirming its strong 
commitment to the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Syria, the 
Security Council also stressed the importance of a Syrian-led political solution to the 
conflict.26 However, neither the presidential statement nor any individual country’s 
statement made specific reference to R2P or the responsibility to prevent in particular. 
Given the escalation of violence and unrest in Syria, the League of Arab States (LAS) 
issued its first condemnatory statement on Syria on August 7, 2011 and called on the 
government of Syria to immediately end the violence.27 However, the statement made no 
explicit reference to R2P. From the initial violence in March 2011 until August 2011, the LAS 
did not respond to the crisis in Syria. The reason for the LAS’s initial silence towards the 
crisis situation in Syria was related to other regional crises that occurred in the wake of the 
Arab Spring, including the political instability in Egypt after the overthrow of Hosni 
Mubarak and NATO’s Libyan operation, which kept LAS’s attention away from the Syrian 
crisis. Similarly, Persian Gulf countries were engaged with unrest in Bahrain, Yemen, and 
Saudi Arabia at the time and were not willing to take any steps against Syria.  
                                                          
21 See The Crisis in Syria, supra note 2. 
22 See Syrian Refugees: A Snapshot of the Crisis—In the Middle East and Europe, MIGRATION POL’Y CTR., 
http://syrianrefugees.eu/ (last updated Oct. 2014). 
23  See Press Release, Francis Deng & Edward Luck, Special Advisers of the United Nations Secretary-General, U.N. Press 
Release (July 21, 2011). 
24  Id. 
25  See U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6598th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6598 (Aug. 3, 2011). 
26  Id. at 2. 
27  See Isabel Coles & Yasmine Saleh, Arab League Expresses Growing Concern About Syria, REUTERS (Aug 7, 2011, 11:13 
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/07/us-syria-league-idUSTRE7761H720110807. 
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The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria (“the Commission”) 
was established on August 22, 2011 by Human Rights Council Resolution 17/1.28 The 
Commission had a mandate to investigate all alleged violations of international human 
rights law that had occurred in Syria since March 2011.29 The Commission was also tasked 
with establishing facts and circumstances that may constitute such violations and other 
crimes perpetrated and, where possible, identifying those responsible with a view to 
ensuring that perpetrators of violations, including those that may constitute crimes against 
humanity, were held accountable.30 Resolution 17/1 was adopted with thirty-three votes in 
favor, four against, and nine abstentions.31 China, Russia, Cuba, and Ecuador voted against 
the resolution.32 Explaining his vote after the adoption of the resolution, the representative 
of Russia stated that the resolution was one sided and could further destabilize Syria.33 The 
Chinese delegation also expressed its concern about the resolution and stated that the 
Syrian crisis should be resolved through discussions and cooperation.34 Although the 
resolution made no reference to R2P or the responsibility to prevent, the votes against the 
resolution represented continued opposition to the taking of any diplomatic measures 
against Syria.  
In October 2011, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Portugal tabled a draft 
resolution at the Security Council, proposing an arms embargo and setting up a new 
sanctions committee.35 The resolution’s preamble emphasized the Syrian government’s 
primary responsibility to protect its population.36 Given strong opposition from some 
Member States, the draft resolution was watered down during negotiations. Despite all the 
revisions, the resolution could not be adopted because Russia and China vetoed it.37 Brazil, 
India, Lebanon, and South Africa abstained from voting on the resolution.38 Russia rejected 
the resolution and stated that it could not agree with accusations against the Syrian regime 
and that the threat of an ultimatum and sanctions against the Syrian authorities was 
unacceptable.39 Russia added that the situation in Syria could not be considered by the 
Security Council separately from the Libyan experience and that a similar interpretation of 
                                                          
28  Human Rights Council Res. S-17/1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-17/2, ¶ 13 (Aug. 22, 2011). 
29  Id. 
30  Id. 
31  Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Human Rights Council on its Seventeenth Special Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-
17/2, at 4 ¶ 25 (Aug. 22, 2011). 
32  Id. 
33  See Human Rights Council, supra note 17. 
34  Id. 
35  S.C. Res. 612 (Oct. 4, 2011). 
36  Id. 
37  Press Release, Sec. Council, Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution Condemning Syria’s Crackdown on 
Anti-Government Protestors, Owing to Veto by Russian Federation, China, U.N. Press Release SC/10403 (Oct. 4, 2011). 
38  U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6627th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6627 (Oct. 4, 2011). 
39  Id. at 3. 
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the Security Council resolutions on Libya should not be a model for the future actions of 
NATO in implementing R2P.40 Russia suspected that excessive force would also be used in 
Syria, as NATO did in Libya. Russia also stressed the importance of knowing how this 
particular resolution would be implemented.41 They asserted that “a significant number of 
Syrians do not agree with the demand for regime change and would rather see gradual 
changes, believing that they have to be implemented while maintaining civil peace and 
harmony in the country.”42  
China highlighted the importance of respecting Syria’s “sovereignty, independence, 
and territorial integrity.”43 China stated that, under the circumstances, sanctions or the 
threat of sanctions would not help to resolve the conflict in Syria and, instead, may further 
complicate the situation. The Indian delegation expressed a similar view and stated that all 
states have a responsibility to respect the fundamental rights of their people, address their 
legitimate aspirations, and respond to their grievances through administrative, political, 
economic, and other measures.44 At the same time, India stressed states also have the 
obligation to protect their citizens from armed groups and militants. India further stated 
that the international community should give the Syrian government time to implement 
the far-reaching reform measures it announced.45  
The states that supported the draft resolution expressed regret at the Security 
Council’s failure to take action to prevent further atrocities in Syria. The United States was 
outraged that the Security Council had “utterly failed to address an urgent moral challenge 
and a growing threat to regional peace and security.”46 United States UN Ambassador Rice 
expressed disappointment at the failure of the Security Council to take action to counter 
Assad’s brutal oppression.47 Rice further stated that, in failing to adopt the draft resolution, 
“the Council [had] squandered an opportunity to shoulder its responsibilities to the Syrian 
people,” and “[t]he crisis in Syria [would] stay before the Security Council, and [the United 
States] [would] not rest until the Council [rose] to meet its responsibilities.”48 Also 
expressing disappointment over the failure of the Security Council to adopt the resolution, 
the United Kingdom stated that the time for strong Security Council action was long 
overdue and that it had to shoulder its responsibilities and take tough actions.49  
                                                          
40  Id. at 4. 
41  Id. 
42  Id. 
43  Id. at 5. 
44  Id. at 5–6. 
45  Id. at 6. 
46  Id. at 8. 
47  Id. 
48  Id. at 9. 
49  Id. at 7. 
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The LAS, at an extraordinary session held in Cairo on October 16, 2011, adopted a 
resolution “calling for a complete and immediate cessation of the acts of violence and 
killing, and for an end to armed actions” to deal with the crisis with a view to prevent more 
casualties in Syria.50 The resolution called on the LAS to establish an Arab Ministerial 
Committee under the chairmanship of Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al-Thani, the Prime 
Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar, to liaise with the Syrian leadership.51 
Following this meeting on October 16, 2011, the Committee, led by Qatar, with delegates 
from Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, and Oman, met with Assad on October 26, 2011 and conveyed 
the decisions of the LAS.52 
On October 30, 2011, the LAS urged Syria to “stop the bloodshed” in a plan accepted 
and signed by Syria on November 2, 2011.53 The action plan urged the Syrian authorities to: 
end all forms of acts of violence, free political prisoners, withdraw all military elements 
from cities and residential neighborhoods, and provide free access to the LAS agencies and 
international media to report on developments and monitor the situation.54 On November 
3, 2011, Nabil el-Araby, the chief of the LAS, met with the Syrian National Council and 
informed its members of the LAS’s action plan.55  
However, the Syrian regime did not immediately comply with the proposals made 
by the LAS, and, in fact, failed to engage in a dialogue with opposition forces within the 
time frame given by the LAS. This willful inaction by the Assad regime triggered debates 
about the need for measures against Syria. On November 7, 2011, the LAS chief called for a 
meeting to assess Syria’s failure to comply with the agreed action plan.56 As a result, on 
November 12, 2011, the Ministerial Council of the LAS suspended Syria’s membership, 
approved with eighteen votes in favor.57 Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon voted against the 
decision, with Iraq abstaining. Following the suspension decision, the LAS adopted 
Resolution 7439 on November 16, 2011, mandating that the LAS send an observer mission 
to Syria.58 Although the resolution aimed to verify implementation of the LAS’s plan of 
                                                          
50  League of Arab States Res. 7435, ¶ 1 (Oct. 16, 2011). 
51  Id. ¶ 2; Arab League Calls for Syria Dialogue Within 15 Days, BBC (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-15330296. 
52  Arab League Holds ‘Frank and Friendly’ Talks with Assad; 20 More Killed in Syrian Violence, AL ARABIA (Oct. 26, 2011), 
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/10/26/173742.html. 
53  Timeline of International Response to the Situation in Syria, GLOBAL CTR. FOR RESP. TO PROTECT 9, 
http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/timeline-of-international-response-to-syria-27.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2016). 
54  Id. 
55  Arab League Chief Meets Syria Opposition Group, HURRIYET DAILY NEWS (Nov. 3, 2011), 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/arab-league-chief-meets-syria-opposition-
group.aspx?pageID=238&nID=6444&NewsCatID=352. 
56  Timeline of International Response to the Situation in Syria, supra note 53, at 9. 
57  Neil Macfarquhar, Arab League Votes to Suspend Syria Over Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2011). 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/world/middleeast/arab-league-votes-to-suspend-syria-over-its-crackdown-on-
protesters.html?pagewanted=all. 
58  League of Arab States Res. 7439, ¶ 1 (Nov. 16, 2011). 
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action, resolve the Syrian crisis, and protect Syrian civilian populations, it made no explicit 
reference to R2P.59 
On November 22, 2011, the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Affairs Committee of 
the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution that called on the government of Syria to 
end all human rights abuses.60 The resolution was adopted with 122 UN members voting in 
favor, 13 against and 41 abstentions.61 It further urged the Assad regime to immediately 
implement the LAS’s November peace plan.62 The resolution did not create any new 
mechanisms or procedures, yet it was meant to send a strong signal to Syria and its people 
that the ongoing human rights violations unfolding there must come to an end. A number 
of delegations highlighted Syria’s primary responsibility to protect its population and 
prevent atrocities against children and women.63 Russia stated that the main co-sponsors 
of the resolution “should remember that being an initial co-sponsor was not only a right, 
but also a responsibility.”64  
In Resolution 7441 of November 24, 2011, the LAS again requested its Secretary 
General to immediately deploy the observer mission to Syria.65 Most importantly, on 
November 27, 2011, the Ministerial Council of the LAS proposed economic sanctions on 
Syria.66 The LAS’s proposed sanctions included a travel ban on some senior officials of the 
Assad regime, a freeze on the Syrian government’s assets in Arab countries, a ban on 
transactions with Syria’s central bank, and an end to all commercial exchanges with the 
government of Syria.67  
In the meantime, the Commission of Inquiry, established by the Human Rights 
Council pursuant to Resolution S-17/1, completed its task and prepared its first report on 
November 23, 2011.68 The report concluded that human rights violations were committed 
by the Syrian military and security forces since the beginning of the protests in March 
2011.69 The report further asserted that crimes against humanity were committed in 
different locations in Syria during the period under review.70 The report underscored the 
Syrian government’s responsibility to protect its population, provide victims with an 
                                                          
59  Id. 
60  Press Release, Gen. Assembly, Third Committee Approves Resolution Condemning Human Rights Violations in 
Syria, by Vote of 122 in Favour to 13 Against, with 41 Abstentions, U.N. Press Release GA/SHC/4033 (Nov. 22, 2011). 
61  Id. 
62  Id. 
63  Id. 
64  Id. 
65  League of Arab States Res. 7441 (Nov. 24, 2011); see also U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Jan. 24, 2012 from the 
Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2012/71 (Jan. 30, 2012). 
66  Timeline of International Response to the Situation in Syria, supra note 53, at 11. 
67  Id.; see also Neil MacFarquhar, Isolating Syria, Arab League Imposes Broad Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2011),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/28/world/middleeast/arab-league-prepares-to-vote-on-syrian-sanctions.html. 
68  See Rep. of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry, supra note 3. 
69  Id. at 1. 
70  Id. 
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effective remedy, and stop atrocities against its people.71 It called upon the Syrian regime 
to put an immediate end to the ongoing gross human rights violations, initiate independent 
and impartial investigations of these violations, and bring the perpetrators of these 
atrocities to justice.72 At the same time, the Human Rights Council adopted Resolution S-
18/1, which mandated the establishment of a Special Rapporteur on the human rights 
situation in Syria.73 The resolution was adopted by a vote of thirty-seven in favor, four 
against, and six abstentions.74 The Russian delegation, which voted against the resolution, 
stated that the resolution exceeded the mandate of the Human Rights Council.75 Expressing 
similar sentiments, China stated that it could not accept any use of force, which would 
threaten the territorial integrity of Syria.76  
The Security Council discussed the Syrian situation again on December 12, 2011.77 
During this meeting, Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, stated that 
an estimated 5,000 people had been killed in Syria since March 2011, and many more 
civilians had been arrested and detained without trial.78 She noted that nearly 12,000 
refugees had fled Syria and many more were internally displaced.79 She highlighted that 
the Syrian government had failed to uphold its responsibility to protect Syrian civilian 
populations and that the international community should undertake effective measures to 
protect the civilian population in Syria.80 
                                                          
71  Id. ¶ 24. 
72  Id. ¶ 112. 
73  Human Rights Council Res. S-18/1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-18/1, ¶ 10 (Dec. 2, 2011). 
74  Press Release, Human Rights Council, Council Concludes Special Session on Situation of Human Rights in Syria, 
Established Mandate of Special Rapporteur for Syria (Dec. 2, 2011), 
  http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11681&LangID=E 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20130901155721/http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?Ne
wsID=11681&LangID=E]. 
75  Human Rights Council, Russia, Vote on Resolution, 18th Special Session, Human Rights Council, UNITED NATIONS 
(Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2011/12/russia-vote-on-resolution-18th-special-session-
human-rights-council.html. 
76  Human Rights Council, China, Vote on Resolution, 18th Special Session, Human Rights Council, UNITED NATIONS (Dec. 
2, 2011), http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2011/12/china-vote-on-resolution-18th-special-session-human-
rights-council.html. 
77  Chronology of Events: Syria, SECURITY COUNCIL REP., 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/syria.php?page=all&print=true (last visited Mar. 28, 2014). 
78  Press Release, United Nations High Comm’r for Human Rights, Syria: Pillay Calls for Urgent Action to Halt Violence 
(Dec. 12, 2011),  
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11705&LangID=E 
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On December 19, 2011,81 the General Assembly adopted a resolution on Syria with 133 
votes in favor, 11 against, and 43 abstentions.82 While Brazil voted in favor, India and South 
Africa abstained from voting on the resolution.83 The resolution called for Syria to 
immediately cease “all human rights violations, to protect their population[,] and to fully 
comply with their obligation under international human rights and humanitarian law.”84  
Given the pressure from regional and international actors, Syria signed a peace deal 
presented by the LAS in which Syria agreed to an Arab observer mission for an initial period 
of one month.85 The peace deal also served to initiate talks between the opposition and the 
government regarding the cessation of violence, release of political and opposition 
prisoners, and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from cities.86 China and Russia welcomed 
the peace deal and applauded the LAS’s involvement in the Syrian peace process, rather 
than bringing the issue to the Security Council.87 
However, Syrian opposition leaders criticized the agreement as a new time-wasting 
tactic by Assad’s regime and, instead, called for foreign military intervention.88 They 
condemned the LAS’s monitors and regarded the mission as a farce, pointing to the 
continuation of violence against protesters in spite of the monitors’ presence.89 “The United 
States reacted skeptically to Syria’s agreement to allow [the LAS] to monitor Syrian 
compliance with [the LAS] peace agreement designed to stop the violence in the country.90 
Moreover, the appointment of Mustafa al-Dabi to lead the LAS observer mission raised 
doubts about the reliability of the mission because al-Dabi had served as a Sudanese 
military commander and intelligence officer and was accused of being involved in war 
crimes in Darfur.91 Despite all these arguments, the LAS mission with sixty observers 
resumed its mission in Syria by late December 2011.92 After establishing contacts with both 
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factions, al-Dabi stated that the situation in Homs was normal.93 Although much criticism 
was levelled against al-Dabi’s leadership, the mission remained in Syria. The mission’s 
report, presented to the LAS on January 22, 2012, criticized the Syrian government for its 
failure to implement the agreement and recommended an extension of the mission.94 
However, Saudi Arabia opposed such an extension and decided to pull its monitors out of 
Syria.95 Following Saudi Arabia, other countries also withdrew their observers from the 
delegation.96 
By the end of January 2012, the LAS acknowledged its failure at peace efforts in Syria 
and stated that the Syrian regime had failed to cooperate with the LAS.97 Given the 
continued violence in Syria, the LAS referred the situation to the UN and presented a peace 
plan that called on Assad to hand over power to his deputy.98 Except for Lebanon, this plan 
was supported by other Arab countries.99 Nevertheless, the countries supporting the plan 
failed to agree on whether it should be submitted to the Security Council. 
Throughout all these attempts at negotiation, the violence in Syria continued, and, 
again, UN Member States made another attempt at the end of January 2012 to address the 
Syrian crisis. During a Security Council discussion on the LAS’s peace plan, Morocco 
introduced a draft resolution under which the Security Council would fully support the 
LAS’s proposal.100 The draft resolution included the LAS’s goal of forming a new, national 
unity government, which required that Assad step aside as part of a democratic transition 
process, grant full authority to his deputy, and hold free elections under Arab and 
international supervision.101  
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During the negotiations on the resolution, Russia and China “continued to oppose 
any action hinting at regime change, coercive measures, or other foreign interference in 
Syria, with the Russian representative warning that such an intervention could spark 
catastrophic civil war and destabilize the region.”102 The Syrian representative stated that, 
instead of interfering in Syria, it was now more important than ever to encourage dialogue 
among Syrians.103 Additionally, the Russian Federation’s representative made clear that 
Russia would not support a solution that might lead to regime change.104 China also 
opposed the threat of force—especially forcible regime change—to resolve the Syrian 
conflict.105 The representative of India pointed out that “[n]either repression nor outside 
intervention” could fulfill “the Syrian people’s aspirations to play a greater role in shaping 
their own destiny.”106  
Clarifying its position, the Chairman of the LAS Ministerial Council stated that there 
was no hidden agenda against the Syrian regime and that the sole objective was to stop the 
massive killing and repression, which had been condemned around the world.107 He further 
stated that the LAS was not calling for military intervention or regime change in Syria.108 
The representative of Syria stated that “he found it strange to see Arab leaders calling for 
action against his country, which had sacrificed much for Arab causes and joining [sic] with 
other States that wished to destroy Syria through the dissemination of false facts.”109 He 
further stated that “Syrians, themselves, would resolve the historic challenges facing their 
homeland without outside intervention.”110  
A vote on Security Council Resolution S/2012/77 was held on February 4, 2012, yet it 
could not be adopted because of Russian and Chinese vetoes.111 In contrast to previous draft 
resolutions on Syria, however, there were no abstentions, and the remaining thirteen states 
voted for the draft resolution.112 Explaining the veto, Russia stated that “the draft resolution 
sought to send an ‘unbalanced’ message to Syria” and that “some influential members of 
the international community had been undermining the possibility of a peaceful settlement 
by advocating regime change.”113 China voiced concern that the approach outlined in the 
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resolution would complicate the situation in Syria.114 Other Member States, in particular 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, expressed their deep disappointment 
and anger about the outcome of the draft resolution.115 
Given the failure to adopt a resolution at the Security Council, on February 16, 2012, 
Saudi Arabia proposed a resolution at the UN General Assembly, condemning the Syrian 
situation and highlighting the importance of ending human rights violations.116 The 
Member States adopted the resolution with 137 votes in favor, 12 against and 17 
abstentions.117 The resolution also expressed its support for the LAS peace plan and 
requested that UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appoint a special representative to 
Syria.118  
Considering successful mediation efforts in Kenya, Kofi Annan was appointed as the 
UN-LAS joint Special Envoy for Syria on February 23, 2012.119 “The Special Envoy [was to] 
provide good offices aimed at bringing an end to all violence and human rights violations, 
and promoting a peaceful solution to the Syrian crisis.”120 The Special Envoy was guided in 
this endeavor by the provisions of General Assembly Resolution A/RES/66/253 and the 
relevant LAS resolutions.121 In rendering his duties as special envoy, Annan consulted 
Member States and “engage[d] with all relevant [parties] within and outside Syria in order 
to end the [mass atrocities] and the humanitarian crisis” in Syria.122  
The Commission of Inquiry, established pursuant to Resolution S-17/1 on the 
situation in Syria, submitted its second report to the Human Rights Council on February 
22, 2012.123 The report concluded that the government of Syria had “manifestly failed in its 
responsibility to protect [its people].”124 Since November 2011, Syria’s forces committed 
more “widespread, systematic, and gross human rights violations.”125 The report further 
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noted the abuses were committed by anti-government groups, “although not comparable 
in scale and organization to those carried out by the Syrian government.”126 
During a session at the end of February, the Human Rights Council discussed the 
situation in Syria.127 It later adopted Resolution 19/1 with thirty-seven in favor, three against, 
and three abstentions.128 The Human Rights Council condemned the escalating 
widespread, systematic, and gross violations of human rights committed by the Syrian 
authorities, as well as ongoing attacks against civilian populations in cities and villages.129 
In his opening remarks, Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser, President of the UN General Assembly, 
highlighted the dire image provided by the Commission of Inquiry of the situation on the 
ground in Syria.130 Al-Nasser also stated that the Syrian government had “manifestly failed 
in its duty to protect its people.”131 Navi Pillay called for “an immediate humanitarian 
ceasefire to end the fighting and bombardments and [requested that] the Syrian authorities 
. . . cooperate fully with international mechanisms, including Mr. Kofi Annan [as Special 
Envoy].”132 She also requested that the Syrian government allow the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights to establish a field presence in Syria.133 However, Syria 
condemned the meeting and said that “it was an effort to politicize the High-level Segment 
of the Human Rights Council.”134 Syria argued that the Human Rights Council “was not an 
appropriate forum for such matters.”135  
During this Human Rights Council session, some delegations, in particular China 
and Russia, expressed their concern about the appeals for regime change in Syria. “They 
rejected any attempt to undermine Syria’s sovereignty and territorial independence.”136 
While expressing its concern for the loss of lives in Syria, Cuba “rejected attempts to 
attribute responsibility for all of the violence to the Syrian regime.” They voiced concern 
“at the appeals for regime change in Syria and [questioned] those who advocated the use 
of force and violence to resolve the conflict.” Cuba also “rejected any attempt to undermine 
Syria’s sovereignty and territorial independence, and it demanded full respect for the 
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principles of self-determination and sovereignty.”137 China stressed the need for “[a]n 
inclusive political dialogue” and stated that it could “not approve an armed intervention or 
the imposition of so-called regime change in Syria.”138 Russia stated “that the politicization 
of the situation in Syria would not facilitate the resolution of the crisis.”139 Venezuela 
expressed similar concerns and stated that “it was unacceptable to justify foreign military 
aggression under the need to protect civilians.”140 The concerns of these delegations 
demonstrated a strong opposition to any intervention or taking any preventive efforts to 
stop atrocities in Syria. They mainly suspected that such efforts would allow external 
intervention in Syria, which possibly would create another Libyan scenario, including 
regime change.  
Other delegations stressed the Syrian government’s responsibility to protect its 
population and demanded that Assad step aside to allow for a peaceful political transition. 
For example, Norway emphasized Syria’s primary responsibility to protect its population 
and reiterated the request that Assad step aside in order to accommodate a political 
transition.141 Most importantly, Norway stated that all Member States had to assume their 
responsibility to protect the population of Syria.142 The United States stated that Assad 
must go.143 
Given the continued escalation of violence in Syria, the President of the Security 
Council issued a statement on March 21, 2012, deploring the deteriorating humanitarian 
situation in Syria and requesting Damascus to grant access to the Under-Secretary General 
for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.144 In light of this statement 
from the President of the Security Council, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed 
hope that this development would mark a turning point in the international community’s 
response to the Syrian crisis.145 
On April 5, 2012, the Security Council adopted another presidential statement 
urging the government of Syria to adhere to its commitment to cease violence.146 On April 
14, 2012, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2042, which emphasized 
the primary responsibility of the government of Syria to protect its population and 
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authorized the deployment “of up to 30 unarmed military observers [to Syria] to liaise with 
the parties and to begin to report on the implementation of a full cessation of armed 
violence in all its forms by all parties, pending the deployment of the mission.”147 The 
resolution also requested proposals for a UN supervision mechanism in Syria “to monitor 
a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties.”148 Although the Russian 
delegation stated that “[t]he text had become much more balanced through extensive 
negotiation . . . [the] Syrian representative said the text was still unbalanced as it did not 
place enough . . . [burden on] opposition groups.”149 However, the Syrian “[g]overnment 
supported Mr. Annan’s mission and [any] measures that would restore the country’s 
stability.”150 For his part, Annan pledged support for monitoring the ceasefire, while 
warning that the monitors must respect Syria’s sovereignty.151 
On April 21, 2012, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2043 and 
established the 300 person UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) to monitor the 
cessation of violence and implementation of the Special Envoy’s plan.152 Importantly, the 
Russian delegation indicated that the Syrian regime would cooperate with observers.153 
However, Russia deplored any deviation from the mandate and stated that “the Libyan 
model should always remain in the past.”154  
On June 1, 2012, upon the request by the Permanent Representatives of Denmark, 
Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the EU, and the United States, the Human Rights 
Council convened a special session on the deteriorating human rights situation in Syria and 
recent killings in El-Houleh.155 During the general debate, most Member States condemned 
the killings in El-Houleh, with many delegations describing the atrocities as crimes against 
humanity.156 The Member States demanded that the Syrian Government cooperate with 
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Special Envoy Annan and the Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry, while 
several delegations stressed that the Security Council must immediately refer the situation 
in Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC).157 However, some Member States stated 
that the events in El-Houleh must not be used as a pretext for foreign intervention, a 
condition that would hold serious consequences for world peace.158 China called on the 
government of Syria to implement the plan of the Special Envoy and Security Council 
resolutions.159 China, however, decisively opposed any form of international intervention 
and regime change.160 
On June 7, 2012, Annan briefed the Security Council on the deteriorating situation 
in Syria, and, on June 15, 2012, UNSMIS suspended its activities.161 Following Annan’s 
briefing to the Security Council, Russia suggested a conference to establish a contact group 
on Syria.162 On July 19, 2012, a draft resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter was 
introduced to the Security Council, cosponsored by France, Germany, Portugal, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States.163 The resolution stressed the Syrian government’s 
primary responsibility to protect its population and prevent atrocities.164 It also authorized 
the Security Council to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to demand verifiable 
compliance within ten days of the resolution’s adoption.165 The resolution was once again 
vetoed by Russia and China, while Pakistan and South Africa abstained.166 Russia reiterated 
its position that it would not accept any resolution containing a threat of sanctions.167 
Given the continued failure of the Security Council to address the situation in Syria, 
the General Assembly adopted a resolution on August 3, 2012 deploring the Security 
Council’s failure to act on Syria and calling for a peaceful political transition.168 On August 
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2, 2012, Kofi Annan resigned as UN-Arab League mediator in Syria.169 Annan pointed to the 
Syrian government’s refusal to cooperate in reaching a peaceful resolution to the conflict, 
the escalating military campaign of the Syrian opposition, and the lack of unity in the 
Security Council as causes for the continued crisis in Syria.170 On August 17, 2012, Lakhdar 
Brahimi was appointed as the Special Representative for Syria.171 Brahimi proposed an Eid 
al-Adha ceasefire, a proposal not implemented because of the escalation of violence in 
Syria.172  
During its next session, the Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 24/22 on the 
continuing grave deterioration of the human rights and humanitarian situation in Syria 
with forty in favor, one against, and six abstentions.173 The resolution condemned the use 
of chemical weapons and the “gross, systematic and widespread violations of human rights” 
by the Syrian authorities.174 The resolution, in less specific language, deplored “any human 
rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law by armed opposition 
groups.”175  
Since the beginning of unrest in Syria, various UN bodies have continued to hold 
meetings and have informally considered many draft resolutions. As can be clearly seen, at 
least one Member State has voted against most of the resolutions. The key objection mainly 
emphasized non-intervention in internal affairs and the refusal to permit the use of force 
to achieve regime change. Both Russia and China have significant economic and military 
relations with Syria. As permanent members of the Security Council, each has vetoed three 
resolutions designed to isolate the Assad regime. Russia says it remains committed to 
finding a peaceful solution, but continues to provide the Assad regime with military 
support. Due to the substantial differences of opinion amongst the Member States, the 
Security Council could not take any significant preventive action on the Syrian crisis.  
On September 19, 2013, in light of the newly proven charges of possession and use of 
chemical weapons by the Syrian regime, Russia and the United States transmitted to the 
Security Council their framework for the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons, agreed 
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upon in Geneva on September 14, 2013.176 On September 24, 2013, “Russian Foreign Minister 
Sergei Lavrov and the United States Secretary of State John Kerry met on the sidelines of 
the General Assembly to discuss a draft resolution on the destruction of the Syrian chemical 
weapons.”177 On September 27, 2013, the Member States of the Security Council 
unanimously adopted Resolution 2118, demanding verification and destruction of the 
chemical weapons stockpiles in Syria.178 The resolution stated that the use of chemical 
weapons anywhere “constitute[d] a threat to international peace and security.”179 The 
resolution also called for the full implementation of the September 27, 2013 decision of the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which “contain[ed] 
special procedures for the expeditious and verifiable destruction of [Syria’s] chemical 
weapons program.”180 Specifically, the resolution prohibited Syria from “us[ing], 
develop[ing], produc[ing], otherwise acquir[ing], stockpil[ing], or retain[ing] chemical 
weapons, or transfer[ring them] . . . to other States or non-State actors,”181 and also 
underscored “that no party in Syria should use, develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, retain, 
or transfer such weapons.”182 The resolution further called for the expeditious destruction 
of Syria’s chemical weapons program,183 with inspections to begin by October 1, 2013.184 The 
resolution also called for convening peace talks and endorsed “the establishment of a 
transitional governing body [in Syria] exercising full executive powers.”185 
Resolution 2118 opened a path for a peaceful solution to the Syrian crisis under the 
patronage of the Security Council. It averted the threat of unilateral military strikes by the 
United States and the United Kingdom. The resolution referred to the option of imposing 
measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in the event Syria failed to implement the 
chemical weapons destruction plan.186 However, this reference did not per se authorize the 
use of force. Therefore, any military action by the United States and its allies without the 
Security Council’s authorization would certainly not have been approved by the Security 
Council. Resolution 2118 did not provide for an automatic authorization to use force in the 
event that the disarmament process failed or the conflict in Syria escalated. A possible 
                                                          
176  Letter dated 19 September 2013 from the Permanent Representatives of the Russian Federation and the United States 
of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/68/398–S/2013/565, at 1 (Sept. 24, 
2013). 
177  Chronology of Events: Syria, supra note 77. 
178  See S.C. Res. 2118, at 2 (Sept. 27, 2013). 
179  Id. 
180  Id. ¶ 3. 
181  Id. ¶ 4. 
182  Id. ¶ 5. 
183  Id. ¶ 3. 
184  Id. at Annex I. 
185  Id. ¶ 16. 
186  Id. ¶ 21. 
 
Indiana Journal of Law & Social Equality  Volume 4, Issue 2 
  
235 
 
intervention would require yet another compromise within the Security Council. 
Therefore, Resolution 2118 shifted the debate on the use of force against Syria to collective 
security action, which is in line with the R2P principle. However, Resolution 2118 does not 
mention the international community’s responsibility to protect the Syrian population 
from mass atrocities but refers solely to the threat to international peace and security posed 
by Syria’s possession and use of chemical weapons. Thus, the question of the international 
community’s responsibility to respond to other atrocities in Syria—which do not emerge 
from chemical weapons—remains unanswered. 
Although Resolution 2118 formed part of the diplomatic solution to the chemical 
weapons problem, as Professor Carsten Stahn points out, the resolution paid little attention 
to the accountability dimensions of the alleged use of chemical weapons.187 The resolution 
addressed the use of chemical weapons primarily through disarmament obligations and 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.188 The resolution did not 
include any concrete options for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, which prevents any 
referral to the ICC.  
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon hailed the resolution’s passage as “the first hopeful 
news on Syria in a long time.”189 However, he noted that “even amid that important step, 
‘we must never forget that the catalogue of horrors in Syria continues with bombs and 
tanks, grenades and guns.’ He said the plan to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons was ‘not 
a license to kill with conventional weapons.’”190 Ki-Moon also stressed that the perpetrators 
of the chemical attacks in Syria must be brought to justice and stated that a UN mission 
had returned to Syria to complete its fact-finding investigations.191 
In the debate that followed Resolution 2118, Member States of the Security Council 
“praised the text for placing binding obligations on . . . al-Assad’s regime, [by] requiring 
[the regime] to get rid of its ‘tools of terror.’”192 US Secretary of State Kerry said that the 
Assad regime “bore the burden of meeting the terms of the resolution.”193   
 
At the same time, Sergey Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 
emphasized that the responsibility for implementing the resolution did not lay with Syria 
alone. The text had not been passed under the [UN] Charter’s Chapter VII, nor did it allow 
for coercive measures. It contained requirements for all countries, especially Syria’s 
neighbours, which must report on moves by non-State actors to secure chemical weapons. . 
                                                          
187  See Carsten Stahn, Syria and the Semantics of Intervention, Aggression and Punishment, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 955, 957, 
958–959 (2013). 
188  S.C. Res. 2118, supra note 178, ¶ 21. 
189  Press Release, Sec. Council, Security Council Requires Scheduled Destruction of Syria’s Chemical Weapons, 
Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2118 (2013), UN Press Release SC/11135 (Sept. 27, 2013). 
190  Id. 
191  Id. 
192  Id. 
193  Id. 
Indiana Journal of Law & Social Equality  Volume 4, Issue 2 
  
236 
 
. . Violations of its requirements and use of chemical weapons by anyone must be carefully 
investigated. . . . Violations must be 100 per cent proven.194 
 
In October 2013, the Member States authorized the establishment of an OPCW-UN 
joint mission to support, monitor, and verify the destruction of the Syrian chemical 
weapons program by June 30, 2014.195 The OPCW-UN joint mission initiated preliminary 
inspections of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal on October 1, 2013.196 Under OPCW 
supervision, Syrian military personnel began destroying munitions. The destruction of the 
Syrian chemical production facilities was to be completed by October 31, 2013.197  
However, the destruction of chemical weapons themselves could not be completed 
by December 31, 2013, as planned.198 Yet, as international efforts continued to eliminate 
Syria’s chemical weapons program, a first consignment of priority chemical materials was 
removed from Syria on January 7, 2014.199 The chemicals were transported from two sites 
to the Syrian port of Latakia and were loaded onto a Danish cargo ship.200 After loading the 
chemical weapons, the ship left for international waters and remained at sea, awaiting the 
arrival of further chemical materials at the Latakia port.201 Sigrid Kaag, the head of the UN 
team charged with destroying Syria’s chemical weapons, briefed the Security Council on 
the “progress as well as logistical and security challenges, confirming that the first quantity 
of chemical materials was loaded onto a Danish ship” on January 7, 2014 and would be 
destroyed outside Syria.202 She highlighted this development as a first important step in an 
expected process of continued destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons.203  
Nevertheless, by end of January 2014, only about four percent of the chemical 
weapons declared by the Syrian government had been removed from Syria.204 Under the 
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UN-backed chemical weapons destruction plan, the Syrian authorities were responsible for 
packing and safely transporting them to Latakia. Syria’s chemical weapons were to be 
completely removed and destroyed by June 30, 2014.205 However, Syria had missed several 
deadlines to remove the chemical weapons, and claimed it would miss the June 30, 2014 
deadline to destroy its chemical arsenal, possibly by several months.206 
Despite efforts by the international community, violence continued across Syria. 
Bombing by helicopter gunships was reported in the town of Kafr Zeita in the central Hama 
province on February 2014.207 “Shelling was also reported in the eastern Ghouta on the 
outskirts of Damascus, in the town of Mleiha.”208 By the end of 2014, hundreds of thousands 
of Syrian civilians had fled rebel-held parts of the city of Aleppo under heavy aerial 
bombardment by the Syrian government, which created one of the largest refugee flows of 
the entire civil war.209 Even today, unrest in Syria continues. Thousands of civilians are 
fleeing from Syria. Some battle for their lives in the middle of seas while some die before 
reaching their destinations. The Syrian refugee crisis has been widely discussed in recent 
months and many countries have agreed and accepted many refugees. Nevertheless, 
questions remain as to whether merely accepting refugees into other nations could help 
stop the violence in Syria. 
 
B. Responsibility to React  
Part of the motivation behind the R2P principle was to shift the legal debate from a 
right of humanitarian intervention to the international community’s collective 
responsibility to protect civilians when a state has manifestly failed to protect its 
population. It is clear that Assad’s regime had failed in this responsibility to prevent and, 
in fact, refuses to protect the civilian population in Syria. Preventive diplomatic measures 
taken by the international community in Syria have not produced results. Russia and China 
have repeatedly argued that the Syrian crisis was an internal matter and that the civil war 
could be resolved only if the Assad regime is part of the negotiations. Both Russia and China 
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rejected any military solutions for the Syrian crisis. The United States, United Kingdom, 
and France have constantly considered Assad to be the principal cause for the atrocities in 
Syria, and these countries believe any political resolution, with or without coercive 
measures, should eventually lead to regime change.  
Soon after the Syrian uprising in 2011, China’s policy on Syria was outlined by a 
Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, stating that the future of Syria should be 
independently decided by the Syrian people themselves, free from external interference.210 
Chinese policy towards the Syrian crisis remained consistent since early 2012.211 Throughout 
the Syrian crisis, China has not been amenable to any type of foreign intervention in Syria.212 
China firmly called for a peaceful solution to the crisis through political dialogue and has 
constantly exercised its veto against UN resolutions on Syria. China requested the 
international community to respect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity 
of Syria.213 China insists that, even to implement non-military measures, the principles of 
the UN Charter and the basic norms of international relations should be strictly observed.214 
The Chinese perspective on intervening in internal affairs of other states has been 
reiterated during the Syrian crisis, which in turn undermined the effective implementation 
of responsibility to react as part of protecting civilian population in Syria from mass 
atrocities.215 
From the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Russia has appeared reluctant to directly 
criticize the Syrian regime and, in fact, has opposed the application of international 
sanctions through the Security Council. As Syria’s traditional partner, Russia has actively 
extended political and weapons support to the Assad regime.216 During the crisis, Russia 
has maintained regular, direct contact with the Assad regime. Throughout the Syrian crisis, 
Russia has maintained the desire to avoid a repeat of the Libyan situation, where it believed 
the UN mandate was used for regime change. Russia Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated 
that “[i]t is not in the interests of anyone to send messages to the opposition in Syria or 
elsewhere that if you reject all reasonable offers we will come and help you as we did in 
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Libya. It’s a very dangerous position.”217 Russia continuously maintained that the situation 
in Syria must be resolved by the Syrians themselves without outside interference. Russia 
categorically opposed any unilateral sanctions or use of force against Syria, stating that any 
such action against the Assad regime would reduce the opportunities for solving the Syrian 
crisis.218 
While China and Russia were against any sanctions or intervention against the 
Syrian regime, the United Kingdom, the United States, and their allies favored the use of 
force in Syria. The United States, the United Kingdom and France threatened Syria with 
the use of unilateral force only after the Syrian chemical weapons attack in August 2013. 
Although the United States and the United Kingdom threatened Syria with possible 
unilateral force, neither country justified their intervention claims in Syria on R2P. Both 
countries justified their push for use of unilateral military force against Syria on the basis 
of the use of chemical weapons by Syria. Thus, the threat to use unilateral military force 
was mainly about enforcing the prohibition on use of chemical weapons rather than 
fulfilling R2P. 
The United Kingdom has threatened the Assad regime with the use of unilateral 
force in order to halt the use and production of chemical weapons, and to protect civilian 
population. They justified their decision on the ground of humanitarian intervention 
without referring to R2P.219 The legal position on military action by the United Kingdom 
against Syria is set out in a government note dated August 29, 2013: under the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention it would be lawful for the United Kingdom to use force against 
another state without a Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force, if the 
Security Council cannot agree to authorize the use force, and if other conditions are met.220 
The document goes on to list three conditions that would have to be met:  
 
(i)  there is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international community 
 as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate 
 and urgent relief; 
(ii)  it must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of 
 force if lives are to be saved; 
(iii)  the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim of relief 
 of humanitarian need and must be strictly limited in time and scope to this aim.221 
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On January 14, 2014, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office submitted an 
official response to questions posed by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 
on the legality of humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorization.222 
This document reconciled the British legal position with R2P as reflected in the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome Document.223 As Goodman noted, the document highlighted three 
related positions: 
 
1.  R2P and the 2005 World Outcome Document involve political commitments 
 aimed at the Security Council taking action; 
2. R2P as set out in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document does not address 
 the  question of unilateral State action in the face of an overwhelming 
 humanitarian catastrophe; and 
3. Unilateral humanitarian intervention is a lawful option when the Security Council 
 fails to take action to stop an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.224 
 
When the Security Council failed to authorize the use of force, the United Kingdom 
tried to argue that R2P and forceful humanitarian intervention complement each other.225 
In such situations, the United Kingdom’s position is that international law permits states 
to use force. Harold Koh agrees with former British Legal Advisor Sir Daniel Bethlehem, 
who stated that “[i]n the case of the law on humanitarian intervention, an analysis that 
simply relies on the prohibition of the threat or use of force in Article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter, and its related principles on non-intervention and sovereignty, is . . . overly 
simplistic.”226 According to Koh, international law has not progressed since Kosovo.227 Koh 
criticizes the Russian and Chinese vetoes “as an absolute bar to lawful action.”228 Koh 
justifies humanitarian intervention in Syria even without Security Council authorization 
because of the “catastrophic humanitarian situation” in the country.229 For Koh, the “per se 
illegal” rule, or the illegality of humanitarian intervention without Security Council 
authorization, “is plainly overbroad.”230 Koh does not agree with humanitarian intervention 
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as being treated as illegal under international law, except for self-defense. For Koh, “a 
nation could lawfully use or threaten [the use of] force for genuinely humanitarian 
purposes, even absent [Security Council authorization].”231 
However, although articles 2(4) and 24(1) of the UN Charter give the Security 
Council a responsibility to act in cases where acts are a threat to international peace and 
security, it does not make that an exclusive responsibility of the Security Council. Under 
this view, the UN Charter does not answer the question whether a group of states with 
genuine humanitarian motives can act collectively with military force to protect civilian 
populations in cases where the Security Council fails to take an effective action in 
protecting civilian populations from mass atrocities. The United States, United Kingdom, 
and France kept open the option of the use of force for humanitarian purposes without the 
Security Council approval. After the Syrian chemical weapons attack in August 2013, these 
countries took a similar approach towards the Syrian crisis as well. Thus, in the face of the 
use of chemical weapons by Syria and the Security Council’s failure to take action to protect 
the civilian population in Syria, the United States, United Kingdom, and France openly 
declared their readiness to take military action against the Assad regime, even without a 
Security Council resolution.232 
The United States did not use humanitarian intervention or R2P as its justification 
for intended military action against Syria. Instead, the United States cited the Syrian 
government’s use of chemical weapons as a justification for its use of force.233 The legal 
position of the United States on the use of force without Security Council approval was 
seen in President Obama’s speech at the UN General Assembly in September 2013.234 
Obama administration officials have said they would take action against the Syrian 
government, even without the backing of other countries or the UN, because diplomatic 
paralysis must not prevent a response to the alleged chemical weapons attack outside the 
Syrian capital.235 Before the chemical weapons destruction plan, the United States justified 
the use of force as a response to the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons.236 
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However, even with the Syrian chemical weapons destruction plan underway, the United 
States has not retreated from the possibility of using force without Security Council 
authorization. 
However, whether or not Security Council authorization was required to intervene 
and protect the civilian population in Syria, the use of chemical weapons should not have 
been the deciding factor. The international community’s focus was on chemical weapons, 
and this approach has undermined responding to the other serious crimes that have 
continued in Syria. However, with the Russian proposal to eliminate Syria’s chemical 
arsenal, the United States withdrew the threat of unilateral military intervention against 
Syria. On September 27, 2013, the Security Council was able to obtain consensus on 
Resolution 2118, which addressed the framework for the elimination of Syrian chemical 
weapons.237 Nevertheless, as stated by U.S. Senator John McCain, by drawing a “red line” 
on chemical weapons, President Obama gave the Assad regime a green light to use every 
other weapon in his arsenal with impunity.238  
 
C. Responsibility to Rebuild 
Of course, at this point, trying to predict rebuilding efforts in Syria may be 
imprudent. The international community remains dedicated to saving Syrians from further 
chemical weapon attacks. However, it is unlikely that chemical weapon removal alone will 
solve the underlying issues of this conflict. In fact, the international community has so far 
failed to protect the Syrian civilian population from the atrocities of the Assad regime. The 
conflict in Syria is ongoing and is likely to continue for some time.239  
The Syrian crisis has resulted in a tragic impact on development performance in 
Syria through destroying economic, social, and human capital, with unbearable losses for 
the Syrian population. As a result of continued fighting, Syria’s economy has taken a 
devastating blow. About seventy-five percent of the manufacturing facilities in Aleppo are 
no longer operating.240 The total loss to the Syrian economy from the crisis by the end of 
2012 is estimated at $48.4 billion.241 Public and private investments were adversely affected 
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by the crisis. The unemployment rate is also on the rise. By end of 2012, the unemployment 
rate had increased by 24.3 percent.242 
In addition to the economic impact, the Syrian crisis affected the lives of over 9 
million people since the start of the crisis in 2011, including 6.5 million people who are now 
displaced.243 According to UN reports, “[a]s many as 2.5 million people are stranded in 
hard-to-reach areas, including in besieged towns, where access to aid has been limited or 
non-existent. Some 2 million people have fled the country, and are now living with host 
families and in refugee sites in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt.” 244 The UN 
Humanitarian Chief Valerie Amos, who visited displaced families in Syria in January 2014, 
stated that Syria is the biggest humanitarian crisis the world faces.245 
Although the Syrian crisis has been ongoing for years, the UN Peacebuilding 
Commission has not discussed any post-conflict rebuilding strategies in Syria. In fact, no 
Member States have raised that issue in any serious way. If Assad prevails and remains in 
power, UN-backed rebuilding efforts would confront a number of obstacles, including lack 
of support from important Member States. In such a case, contributions from traditional 
donors, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and the EU, would be highly 
unlikely. However, since the conflict is not over, and in light of how the conflict has 
unfolded, serious doubts have been raised about the likelihood of effective rebuilding 
efforts that will eventually take place in Syria.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The Syrian crisis, now recognized as one of the worst humanitarian tragedies of the 
twenty-first century, has also been accepted as the most recent R2P controversy.246 The 
situation in Syria has not changed even after the implementation of the destruction of 
chemical weapons in the country. All discussions on confidence-building measures and 
allowing aid to affected areas ended without any success. The Geneva talks on a political 
resolution to the conflict and improving humanitarian conditions resumed on January 22, 
2014, but ended without any agreement.247 This failure was due to the Syrian opposition 
groups and the international community’s pressure to oust Assad from power. The Syrian 
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government refused to engage in any discussions on transition plans and emphasized the 
need to fight against terrorism.248 The Syrian government continued its suppression of 
opposition groups and civilian populations living in rebel-held areas.249 Clashes intensified 
between the rebel groups and made the situation even worse. In addition to the escalating 
violence in the country, Syria could not abide by the deadlines of the chemical weapons 
destruction plan.250 After missing the February 5, 2014 deadline for handing over all 
chemical weapons stockpiles, Syria accepted a new April 10 deadline.251 
While violence and human rights deterioration continued in Syria, the UN also took 
a number of measures to support the imperiled civilian population. On February 22, 2014, 
the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2139 and demanded that Syrian 
authorities and rebel factions allow unhindered support for UN humanitarian agencies.252 
Importantly, Syria announced its readiness to cooperate with the Security Council 
resolution if Syria’s state sovereignty was respected.253 Following this resolution, UN aid 
trucks gained authorization to enter Syria on March 19, 2014.254 In the meantime, with 
increased political and military confidence, the Assad regime announced its decision to 
hold presidential elections in June 2014 and declared Assad a presidential candidate.255 
Despite this major political step, violence in the country continued to mount and human 
rights conditions continued to deteriorate. Against this background, the UN Syrian envoy 
Brahimi resigned on May 13, 2014.256 Although the humanitarian situation in the country 
had deteriorated, Russia and China vetoed the Security Council Resolution calling for the 
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Syrian crisis to be referred to the ICC.257 Although these states agreed to refer the Darfur, 
Libya, and Côte d’Ivoire crises to the ICC, they refused such a reference in the Syrian case.  
Despite the development and use of R2P in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, the Syrian crisis 
has so far demonstrated that R2P is still burdened by many unresolved problems. In fact, 
the R2P principle seems to have mattered very little in how this crisis has unfolded. Years 
have passed since the Syrian crisis began and reactions to this crisis have been mixed. The 
reaction has certainly been far from anything resembling a consensus, let alone a clear 
international legal situation.  
Analysis of the state practice during the Syrian crisis revealed disagreements on 
whether Syria had fulfilled its responsibility to protect its civilian population. The ongoing 
mass atrocities against civilians in Syria warrant the application of the R2P principle. 
However, China, Russia and other like-minded countries took the position that the Syrian 
crisis was an internal matter, which the Syrian government was capable of handling. 
Meanwhile, other members of the BRICS (Brazil, South Africa, and India) were also 
skeptical whether R2P had been triggered in Syria. It seems that these Member States were 
upholding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria, despite well-reported mass 
atrocities. On the other hand, the United States, the United Kingdom, and like-minded 
countries demanded that the Syrian government stop atrocities against civilians.258 This 
same situation occurred during the Darfur crisis, where Member States could not agree 
whether Sudan had failed to protect its population. However, during the Libyan and Côte 
d’Ivoire crises, Member States eventually agreed that these respective states failed to 
protect their populations. Similar to the Darfur crisis, state practice during the Syrian crisis 
thus revealed a greater recognition of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-
intervention principles rather than R2P. However, in light of chemical weapons possessed 
and used by the Syrian regime, Evans stated that the proven use of chemical weapons would 
be a profound breach of Syria’s responsibility to protect.259  
Nevertheless, throughout the Syrian crisis, the Security Council made a number of 
efforts to implement different preventive measures to protect civilians. Despite all such 
efforts, however, three Security Council resolutions were vetoed by Russia and China. 
Neither country was willing to impose any direct preventive measures, such as sanctions or 
air travel bans, claiming that such measures violated territorial integrity and state 
sovereignty. Member States objected to adopting the R2P framing in UN decisions, and not 
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even a condemnatory statement could be agreed upon in the Syrian crisis.260 Although state 
practice in the Libyan and Côte d’Ivoire crises indicated that R2P influenced how states 
think and talk about humanitarian intervention, the state practice in the Syrian crisis did 
not reflect this influence. State practice of important countries during the Syrian crisis 
emphasized sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention even in the face of mass 
atrocities.  
All preventive efforts by regional and international actors failed to stop Syrian 
atrocities, and in the light of Syria’s use of chemical weapons, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and France favored the use of military force in Syria. However, neither the United 
States nor the United Kingdom justified their intervention claims in Syria on R2P. The 
United States justified its claim on the basis of the use of chemical weapons by Syria. This 
state practice, in fact, is a departure from the R2P framing. On the other hand, these 
countries were ready to use military force against Syria even without Security Council 
authorization. However, India, China, Russia and like-minded countries opposed such 
unilateral military actions against Syria on the basis of non-intervention, sovereignty and 
the territorial integrity of Syria. This controversy also marked a return to the traditional 
controversy in international law on whether Security Council authorization is required to 
use force for humanitarian intervention purposes. During the crises in Darfur, Libya, and 
Côte d’Ivoire, this controversy did not arise. The re-emergence of this traditional 
controversy in international law is a failure of R2P, especially to resolve this long-standing 
controversy in international law on the use of force.  
Chinese and Russian vetoes suggested that these countries were working to protect 
an important regional ally. Although China and Russia did not block the use of force in 
Libya or Côte d’Ivoire, their vetoes on resolutions against Syria demonstrated their 
suspicion about a possible misuse of Security Council authority based on what happened 
in the Libyan and Côte d’Ivoire episodes. Despite the fact that many other countries favored 
such stronger international intervention, the Security Council failed to take any action 
because of Chinese and Russian vetoes, and this outcome suggests that R2P’s close 
association with the Security Council needs to be rethought.  
However, the Security Council’s unanimous adoption of Resolution 2118—
demanding verification and destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles in Syria—
demonstrated a positive sign of agreement among the UN members, at least regarding the 
production and usage of chemical weapons by Syria. Although UN members were united 
in acting to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons, they were not ready to provide robust 
humanitarian assistance for victims in Syria. In fact, the UN reportedly failed to collect the 
targeted budget for much-needed humanitarian assistance for thousands of Syrians. 
Although the UN and many other non-governmental organizations have issued periodic 
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reports on the crisis, none has provided a sustainable solution to the humanitarian crisis 
or relief efforts in Syria. The Security Council has not wielded real effort to address the 
needs of the trapped civilian population in Syria. The majority of the Syrian population 
outside of government-controlled areas has remained in urgent need of medical and 
humanitarian assistance. Even the main humanitarian relief providers, such as OXFAM, 
Red Cross and Red Crescent, and Save the Children, are not present in areas of urgent need, 
particularly because of the security, safety, and access issues. The international relief efforts 
are delayed not only because of the bureaucratic hurdles but also because of inaccurate 
needs assessment and the absence of an effective Security Council mandate for cross-
border relief. On the other hand, although states may support humanitarian relief efforts, 
how the Security Council might impactfully act without the consent of the Syrian regime 
is not clear. 
The ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria poses major challenges to the R2P 
principle. As the Syrian crisis demonstrates, instances of mass atrocities and human rights 
violations, similar to historical atrocities in both Bosnia and Rwanda, still persist. One of 
the main reasons for the continuation of mass atrocities in Syria is inaction by the Security 
Council. Apart from the R2P principle’s own uncertainties regarding its scope, the lack of 
real consensus between some Member States has further hindered decisive action under 
R2P to halt ongoing atrocities in Syria. The international community, thus, confronted the 
very familiar controversies about sovereignty and non-intervention and the need to protect 
civilian populations from human rights violations. Simply stated, no consensus could be 
reached among the Member States on what response should be implemented to protect 
civilians in Syria. Similar uncertainties confronted the pre-R2P humanitarian intervention 
context as well. Thus, state practice throughout the Syrian crisis revealed that R2P has not 
changed existing international law.  
